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Quantum communication holds the promise of creating disruptive technologies that will play an
essential role in future communication networks. For example, the study of quantum communication
complexity has shown that quantum communication allows exponential reductions in the information
that must be transmitted to solve distributed computational tasks. Recently, protocols that realize
this advantage using optical implementations have been proposed. Here we report a proof of concept
experimental demonstration of a quantum fingerprinting system that is capable of transmitting less
information than the best known classical protocol. Our implementation is based on a modified
version of a commercial quantum key distribution system using off-the-shelf optical components
over telecom wavelengths, and is practical for messages as large as 100 Mbits, even in the presence
of experimental imperfections. Our results provide a first step in the development of experimental
quantum communication complexity.
What technological advantages can be achieved by di-
rectly harnessing the quantum-mechanical properties of
physical systems? In the context of communications,
it is known that quantum mechanics enables several re-
markable improvements, such as cryptographic protocols
that are classically impossible [1–3], enhanced metrol-
ogy schemes [4], and reductions in the communication
required between distributed computing devices [5–14].
And yet, despite our advanced understanding of what
these quantum advantages are, demonstrating them in a
practical setting continues to be an outstanding and cen-
tral challenge. Important progress has been made in this
direction [15–23], but many cases of quantum improve-
ments have never been realized experimentally.
A particular example of a quantum advantage occurs
in the field of communication complexity: the study of
the minimum amount of information that must be trans-
mitted in order to solve distributed computational tasks
[5–9]. It has been proven that for certain problems, quan-
tum mechanics allows exponential reductions in commu-
nication compared to the classical case [7, 10–14]. These
results, beside being of great fundamental interest, have
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important practical applications for the design of commu-
nication systems, computer circuits, and data structures
[7, 24]. However, to date, only a few proof-of-principle
implementations of quantum communication complexity
protocols have been reported [25–27]. Crucially, none
of them have demonstrated a reduction in the trans-
mitted information compared to the classical case. Re-
cently, protocols have been introduced that are capable
of achieving this reduction using practical optical imple-
mentations [28–30], thus opening the door to experimen-
tal demonstrations of the exponential reductions of quan-
tum communication complexity.
Quantum fingerprinting is arguably the most appeal-
ing protocol in quantum communication complexity, as
it constitutes a natural problem for which quantum me-
chanics permits an exponential reduction in communica-
tion complexity [10, 28, 31]. In this problem, Alice and
Bob are each given an n-bit string, which we label x and y
respectively. In the simultaneous message passing model
(SMP) [5], they must each send a message to a third
party, the referee, whose task is to decide whether the
inputs x and y are equal or not with an error probability
of at most . Alice and Bob do not have access to shared
randomness and there is only one-way communication to
the referee. In this case, it has been proven that any
classical protocol for this problem must transmit at least
Ω(
√
n) bits of information to the referee [32, 33]. On the
other hand, a quantum protocol was specified in Ref. [10]
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2that transmits only O(log2 n) qubits of information – an
exponential improvement over the classical case. How-
ever, the proof-of-principle implementations of quantum
fingerprinting that have been reported so far only demon-
strated the protocol for messages of one single qubit of
information, with no reduction in the transmitted infor-
mation compared to the classical case [25, 26].
In this work, we present an experimental demonstra-
tion of a quantum fingerprinting system that is capable of
transmitting less information than the best known clas-
sical protocol for this problem. Our system is based on
the quantum fingerprinting protocol with weak coherent
states of Ref. [28]. Although this protocol is already
practical, we overcome various challenges to its exper-
imental implementation. First, we develop an efficient
error-correction algorithm that allows us to substantially
relax the requirements on the experimental devices and
reduce the running time of the protocol. Second, we use
an improved decision rule for the referee compared to
the one used in Ref. [28]. Finally, we perform detailed
simulations of the protocol that allows us to identify the
appropriate parameters for performing the experiment.
This enables us to run the protocol using commercial off-
the-shelf components.
Indeed, we implemented the protocol by using a com-
mercial plug&play system originally designed for quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [34], to which we added sev-
eral important modifications. We also characterized the
system and showed that, within our theoretical model
of the experiment, its performance is consistent with
achieving the desired error probability. Finally, we exper-
imentally tested the system for input sizes of up to 100
Mbits, using actual codewords obtained from our error-
correction algorithm, but also using repeated random bi-
nary sequences to simulate the codewords. We obtained
data that are consistent with the protocol transmitting
less information than the best known classical protocol.
In the remainder of this paper, we discuss our quan-
tum fingerprinting protocol in detail, focusing on how the
choice of parameters affects the error probability and the
transmitted information of the protocol. We proceed by
describing our error-correction algorithm and conclude
by reporting the experimental results as well as discussing
the significance of our work.
Coherent-state quantum fingerprinting protocol
In the quantum fingerprinting protocol of Ref. [28],
portrayed in Fig. 1, Alice first applies an error-correcting
code E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m to her input x of n bits. This
results in a codeword E(x) of m = nR bits, which she
uses to prepare a sequence of m coherent states, where
R = nm < 1 is the rate of the code. This sequence of
coherent states is given by the state
FIG. 1: (Colour online) A schematic illustration of the quan-
tum fingerprinting protocol. Alice and Bob receive inputs
x and y, respectively, which they feed to an error-correcting
code to produce the codewords E(x) and E(y). Using these
codewords, they modulate the phases of a sequence of coher-
ent pulses that they send to the referee. The incoming signals
interfere at a beam-splitter (BS) and photons are detected in
the output using single-photon detectors D0 and D1. In an
ideal implementation, detector D1 fires only when the inputs
to Alice and Bob are different.
|α, x〉 =
m⊗
i=1
∣∣∣∣(−1)E(x)i α√m
〉
i
. (1)
Here E(x)i is the ith bit of the codeword and α is a com-
plex amplitude. Notice that all the coherent states have
the same amplitude, but their individual phases depend
on the particular codeword, which in turn is determined
by the input x. The total mean photon number in the
entire sequence is µ := |α|2, which in general depends on
the length of the codewords m.
Bob does the same as Alice for his input y, and they
both send their sequence of states to the referee, who in-
terferes the individual states in a balanced beam-splitter.
The referee checks for clicks at the outputs of the inter-
ferometer using single-photon detectors, which we label
“D0” and “D1”. In the ideal case, a click in detector D1
will never happen if the phases of the incoming states
are equal, i.e. if E(x)i ⊕ E(y)i = 0. However, it is pos-
sible for a click in detector D1 to occur if the phases are
different, i.e. if E(x)i ⊕ E(y)i = 1. Thus, if x 6= y, we
expect a number of clicks in D1 that is proportional to
the total mean number of photons and the Hamming dis-
tance between the codewords. This allows the referee to
distinguish between equal and different inputs by simply
checking for clicks in detector D1.
In Ref. [28], it was proven that the quantum informa-
tion Q that can be transmitted by sending the states of
Eq. (1) satisfies
Q = O(µ log2 n), (2)
3which, for fixed µ, is an exponential improvement over
the classical case. Essentially, by fixing the total mean
photon number to a constant, we are restricting ourselves
to an exponentially small subspace of the larger Hilbert
space associated with the optical modes, which in turn
restricts the capability of these systems to transmit in-
formation.
In the presence of experimental imperfections such as
detector dark counts and optical misalignment, detector
D1 may fire even when the inputs are equal. Therefore,
it does not suffice to check for clicks in this detector –
we must introduce a different decision rule for the ref-
eree. The decision rule proposed in Ref. [28], which is
based on the fraction of clicks that occur in detector D1,
is extremely sensitive to experimental imperfections. In-
stead, in this work we construct a better decision thresh-
old based only on the total number of clicks observed in
detector D1.
Let D1,E and D1,D be random variables correspond-
ing to the number of clicks in detector D1 for the case of
equal and worst-case different inputs, respectively. It can
be shown that these distributions can be well approxi-
mated by binomial distributions D1,E ∼ Bin(m, pE) and
D1,D ∼ Bin(m, pD), where m is the number of modes
and pE , pD are the probabilities of observing a click in
each mode for the case of equal and worst-case inputs
respectively. These probabilities are given by [28]:
pE =(1− e−
2(1−ν)µ
m ) + pdark (3)
pD =δ(1− e−
2νµ
m ) + (1− δ)(1− e− 2(1−ν)µm ) + pdark. (4)
Here ν is the interference visibility – which quantifies
the contrast of the interferometer – and pdark, the dark
count probability, is the probability that a detector will
fire even when no incident photons from the signals are
present. As before, µ is the total mean photon number
in the signals and δ is the minimum distance of the error-
correcting code, which is defined as the smallest relative
Hamming distance between any two distinct codewords.
The referee sets a threshold value D1,th such that, if
the number of clicks is smaller or equal than D1,th, he
will conclude that the inputs are equal. Otherwise, he
concludes that they are different. Note that, unlike the
ideal case, in the presence of imperfections, an error can
occur even when the inputs are equal. In our protocol,
the value of D1,th is chosen in such a way that an er-
ror is equally likely to occur in both cases, so that the
probability of error is given by
Pr(error) = Pr(D1,E > D1,th) = Pr(D1,D ≤ D1,th),
(5)
which can be calculated directly from the distributions of
D1,E andD1,D. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. Finally, note
that this model is expected to be correct as long as the
parameters quantifying the experimental imperfections
as well as the mean photon number µ are all constant
during the run of the protocol. In practice this is not
necessarily the case, so our model should be understood
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FIG. 2: (Colour online) An illustration of the probability dis-
tributions for the number of clicks in detector D1 for equal
inputs (x = y) and worst-case different inputs (x 6= y). The
distributions are shown for three different total mean pho-
tons numbers: µ1 (solid), µ2 (dashed) and µ3 (dotted), with
µ1 < µ2 < µ3. The distributions for equal inputs (green) are
dominated by dark counts, so they are largely unaffected by
changes in µ. On the other hand, for the worst-case different
inputs (blue), the mean value of the distributions depends
strongly on µ. Therefore, the error in distinguishing both
distributions can be controlled by choosing µ appropriately.
as an approximation of the actual performance of the
system.
Finally, we note that in any implementation of the pro-
tocol there will be some loss captured by the combined
effect of limited detector efficiency and channel loss. We
quantify this with the single parameter η < 1. As shown
in Ref. [28], the effect of loss can be compensated by
adjusting the total mean photon number accordingly:
µ→ µ/η. Thus, the protocol is robust to loss.
Error-Correcting Code
In quantum fingerprinting, an error-correcting code
(ECC) is used to amplify the Hamming distance between
the inputs of Alice and Bob. Even if these inputs are orig-
inally very close to each other – for example if they differ
in a single position – after applying the ECC, the re-
sulting codewords will have a much larger Hamming dis-
tance. In the worst-case scenario, this distance is given
by the minimum distance of the code. Note, however,
that no error-correction actually takes place in the quan-
tum fingerprinting protocol – we just use the properties
of error-correcting codes to increase the distance between
the inputs.
The quantum fingerprinting protocol of Ref. [28] used
Justesen codes as an example to illustrate the properties
of the protocol. However, these codes are not optimal
for quantum fingerprinting. In this section, we construct
more efficient codes based on random Toeplitz matrices
that significantly relax the requirements on the experi-
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FIG. 3: (Colour online) The Gilbert-Varshamov bound com-
pared to the distance-rate relationship achieved by Justesen
codes. For various rates, a code satisfying the GV bound –
like the one we use in our protocol – achieves a minimum
distance that is more than three times the value for Justesen
codes.
mental devices and lead to a faster implementation of the
protocol. Due to their probabilistic construction, these
codes are not guaranteed to have the desired minimum-
distance, but do achieve it with exponentially high prob-
ability (See Supplementary Material). Therefore, in our
protocol, we only claim that, with exponentially high
probability, we are using codes with the desired prop-
erties.
An ECC with a high rate and a large minimum dis-
tance is desired, since a higher rates leads to lower trans-
mitted information and larger tolerance for dark counts,
while a larger minimum distance leads to smaller error
probability for fixed mean photon number. Fundamen-
tally, there is an inherent trade-off between the rate and
distance of ECCs. In particular, the Gilbert-Varshamov
(GV) bound [35, 36] states that there exists some binary
linear code whose rate R and minimum distance δ satisfy
the relation
R ≥ 1−H2(δ), (6)
where H2(·) is the binary entropy function. Using a bi-
nary linear code that approaches this bound would con-
stitute a significant improvement over the codes used in
previous protocols. This is clearly illustrated in Fig. 3.
It is well known in coding theory that random lin-
ear codes (RLCs) can asymptotically approach the GV
bound with encoding complexity O(n2) [37]. However,
in quantum fingerprinting, the input size n is typically
very large (e.g. n = 108), thus making the encoding time
prohibitively high. In order to reduce this encoding com-
plexity, we make use of a subclass of RLCs whose gener-
ator matrices are Toeplitz matrices. A Toeplitz matrix is
a matrix in which each descending diagonal from left to
right is constant. An n×m Toeplitz matrix is completely
determined by the n+m−1 elements on its first row and
column. This structure implies that only O(n log n) time
for encoding is required for this subclass of RLCs [38].
Additionally, these codes also asymptotically approach
the GV bound (see Supplementary Material for a proof).
By using this family of codes, we are able to reduce the
encoding times by several orders of magnitude, making
them suitable for practical applications.
The exponential separation between quantum and clas-
sical communication complexity for the equality function
only holds if Alice and Bob do not have access to shared
randomness that is generated in each run of the proto-
col [32]. However, even though the generator matrices
of our RLCs are randomly constructed, once they have
been created they remain fixed for all future instances
of the protocol. This ensures that no new randomness
is generated in each run of the protocol, as required to
satisfy the conditions of the exponential separation. In
particular, Alice and Bob can store the generator ma-
trices in memory and use them to encode their inputs
in exactly the same way as if they had been generated
deterministically.
For our experiment, an encoder program written in
C++ was built and tested, demonstrating the feasibility
of this subclass of RLCs. The free Fast-Fourier Trans-
form library FFTW was used to accelerate multiplica-
tions with Toeplitz matrices [39] and the random num-
bers to construct the matrices were generated from a
quantum random number generator [40]. The results
from an optimized encoder are shown in Table I. As we
can see, our encoder is highly practical, can be run on
any common lab PC, and finishes the encoding in an ac-
ceptable time frame for input sizes as large as n = 3×108.
Faster encoding times could be obtained by using dedi-
cated hardware.
n (bit) m (bit) Time (s) Memory (Mbit)
106 5× 106 6 52
107 5× 107 106 733
3× 107 1.5× 108 181 1654
3× 108 1.5× 109 4831 10000
TABLE I: The performance of the encoder for different input
sizes, using a computer with a quad-core i7-4770 @3.4GHz
CPU and 16GB RAM. Running times are acceptable for ex-
perimental applications for input sizes as large as n = 3×108.
Experimental setup
We demonstrate our proof of concept quantum finger-
printing protocol using a plug&play scheme [41], initially
designed for quantum key distribution (QKD). The ad-
vantage of the plug&play system with respect to other
viable systems is that it offers a particularly robust and
stable implementation. This allows us to perform reliable
experiments with highly attenuated coherent states for
long time durations. We implement the protocol on top
5of two commercial systems, namely ID-500 and Clavis2,
manufactured by ID Quantique [34].
In our set-up, which is shown in Fig. 4, the referee
starts by sending two strong pulses at about 1551 nm to
Alice over a 5 km fiber. The two pulses are created from
a single pulse by a beam splitter (BS), and they take
paths of different length before being recombined by a
polarization beam splitter (PBS). The linear polarization
of the pulse travelling through the longer path, which
corresponds to Bob’s system, is rotated by 90◦. After
reaching the PBS, the two pulses exit through the same
port and travel to Alice with a time delay between them
caused by the difference in path lengths. The front and
back pulses are called the reference pulse and the signal
pulse, respectively.
Once they reach Alice, she uses the reference pulse as
a synchronization signal to activate her phase modulator
(PM), which she employs to set the phase of the signal
pulse according to her codeword E(x). Both pulses are
reflected back by a Faraday mirror (FM), which rotates
the pulses’ polarization by 90◦, and she attenuates them
to the desired photon level using the variable optical at-
tenuator (VOA). Once the pulses return back, due to the
FM, the pulses take opposite paths, such that the ref-
erence pulse now passes through Bob and its phase is
modulated by Bob’s PM according to E(y). Finally, the
two pulses interfere at the referee’s BS and the detection
events are registered using two high-quality single-photon
detectors D0 and D1. It is important to note that the re-
turning signal pulse modulated by Alice travels directly
to the referee, while the returning reference pulse pass-
ing through Bob does not contain any information about
Alice’s codeword. This guarantees that there is no com-
munication between Alice and Bob.
Since the operating conditions of our protocol are sig-
nificantly different from those of standard QKD, using
a commercial QKD equipment for our implementation
requires several important modifications to the system.
First, two single-photon detectors with low dark count
rates were installed. Indeed, as can be deduced from
Eqs. (3) and (4), lower dark count rates permit the op-
eration of the system at lower mean photon numbers,
which lead to a reduction in the transmitted informa-
tion. Fortunately, our error correction codes improve the
tolerance of the protocol to dark counts, which permits us
to use commercial detectors. We employ two commercial
free-running InGaAs avalanche photodiodes – ID220 [34].
The dark count rate per 1 ns detection gate is about
(3.5 ± 0.2) × 10−6 and the corresponding quantum ef-
ficiency is about 20%. The detections are recorded by
a high-precision time interval analyzer (TIA, PicoQuant
HydraHarp 400). The system was run at a repetition rate
of 5 MHz with the detector dead time set at 10µs. This
means that after a click occurred, the following 50 pulses
are blocked before the detector is active again. This is
not a problem in our experiment because the mean pho-
ton number in each pulse is extremely low, therefore the
expected number of undetected photons as a result of this
effect is negligible compared to other sources of error (see
Supplementary Material for details).
Additionally, new functionalities and control signals
were added to the system. On one hand, we use the VOA
inside Alice to reduce the mean photon number per pulse
down to suitable numbers. These values – in the order
of 10−5 per pulse – were in fact four orders of magni-
tude lower than those typically used for QKD. Hence,
several calibration processes of the system are required,
which imposes particular care in the synchronization of
the phase modulation and attenuation signals. On the
other hand, commercial QKD systems like Clavis2 have
an internal random number generator to set the phase
modulations, which does not allow us to modulate the
phases according to the pre-generated codewords. We
solve this difficulty by using two external function gen-
erators (FG, Agilent 88250A) loaded with the codewords
to control Alice’s and Bob’s PM. This requires precise
synchronization and calibration procedures to guarantee
correct phase modulations. We finally observed high in-
terference visibility of about (99 ± 0.5)% after careful
calibration.
In the implementation on ID-500, the random numbers
controlling the phase modulations are accessible to users.
We use our codewords to replace those random numbers
directly. However, after testing for an input data size of
n = 1.42×108 on ID-500, an unexpected hardware prob-
lem made ID-500 unavailable for further experiments. To
further test the feasibility of our protocol for different in-
put sizes, we switched to Clavis2 for measurements. In
the implementation on Clavis2, since each function gen-
erator has a small memory, for simplicity we load a frame
of about 430 random numbers to each function genera-
tor and reuse these random numbers. This allows us
to create binary sequences with the desired distance δ
that can be used to test the performance of the system.
All the above modifications led to the development of a
practical system that is capable of performing quantum
fingerprinting.
Experimental results
We perform the quantum fingerprinting experiment
over a standard telecom fiber of 5 km between Alice and
the referee. The overall loss between the output of Alice’s
VOA and the input of the referee’s detector D1 – which
includes the losses of quantum channel, PBS, BS and the
circulator – is about 3 dB (2.36 dB) for ID-500 (Clavis2).
The channel between Bob and the referee is about a few
meters, and its overall loss including Bob’s channel, the
BS and the circulator, is about 1.5 dB (1 dB). We sum-
marize all system parameters in Table II. Based on these
parameters, for a given input size n, we use our model of
the protocol to optimize the photon number µ in order
to achieve a desired error probability .
Because there is loss in the channels and the detec-
tors are not perfectly efficient, Alice and Bob must use
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Experimental setup for quantum fingerprinting. The laser source at the referee’s setup emits photon
pulses which are separated at a 50:50 beam-splitter (BS) into two pulses, the signal pulse and the reference pulse. The reference
pulse passes through Bob’s phase modulator (PM) and then through a polarization rotator which rotates the pulses’ polarization
by 90◦. The pulses are then recombined at a polarization beam splitter (PBS) where they exit through the same port and travel
to Alice through the 5 kms fiber. Alice uses the reference pulse as a synchronization (Sync) and uses her phase modulator (PM)
to set the phase of the signal pulse according to her codeword E(x). Once the two pulses are reflected back by the Faraday
mirror (FM), she attenuates them to the desired photon level by using the variable optical attenuator (VOA). When the two
pulses return in the direction of the referee, because of Alice’s FM, the reference pulse will travel through Bob, who uses his
PM to modulate the pulse according to his codeword E(y). Both Alice and Bob use two external function generators (FG)
to control the PMs. Finally, the two pulses arrive simultaneously at the BS, where they interfere and are detected by two
detectors D0 and D1. The detection events are recorded by a time interval analyzer (TIA).
ηAR ηBR ηdet pdark ν
3 dB (2.36 dB) 1.5 dB (1 dB) 20.0% (3.5± 0.2)× 10−6 (99± 0.5)%
TABLE II: Parameters measured in the implementations. The overall loss between the output of Alice’s VOA and the input to
the referee’s detectors is given by the parameter ηAR. Similarly, ηBR defines the overall loss between the output of Bob’s PM
and the referee’s detectors. Both ηAR and ηBR are carefully characterized in ID-500 (Clavis2). The other parameters are the
detector’s quantum efficiency ηdet, dark count rate per pulse pdark for each detector, and system visibility ν, which are nearly
the same for ID-500 and Clavis2.
higher mean photon numbers compared to the case with
no channel loss and perfect detectors. As implied by Eq.
(2), this also leads to an increase in the transmitted infor-
mation, which we take into account in our calculations
of the transmitted information. In particular, if Alice
and Bob experience different amounts of loss, they must
choose a different mean photon number when preparing
their signals, ensuring that the amplitude of their pulses
is equal when they interfere in the referee’s beam splitter.
In the experiment, the detection events registered on
D0 and D1 in conjunction with the known experimen-
tal conditions in the system can be used to character-
ize the photon numbers sent out by Alice and Bob, the
dark count probability, and the visibility of the interfer-
ometer. From the characterization of these parameters,
we find that there is a good agreement with our model
of the system. The main source of uncertainty is due
to an imperfect matching between the observed mean
photon numbers and those pre-calibrated from the VOA.
This uncertainty is determined by the fluctuations of sev-
eral devices, such as laser power, VOA, and detector effi-
ciency. The detailed values of this uncertainty are shown
in the Supplementary Material.
The quantum fingerprinting protocol is tested over sev-
eral values of the input size n. For each n, we record the
detection counts on D1 for two types of input data: equal
inputs E(x) = E(y), and the worst-case different inputs,
i.e. those for which the codewords E(x) 6= E(y) have
a distance equal to the minimum distance. For our ex-
periment, we minimize the transmitted information by
choosing an optimal value of δ = 0.22 for the minimum
distance. From the threshold value D1,th that is pre-
calculated from our model, the referee can distinguish
between equal and different inputs. The upper bound Q
on the quantum information Alice and Bob is calculated
from their respective mean photon numbers µA and µB ,
as well as the codeword length m.
In Fig. 5, we show the transmitted information as a
function of the input size n for a target error probability
of  = 5 × 10−5. The error probability was calculated
from our theoretical model of the experiment. within
experimental uncertainty, the worst-case values of the
mean photon number, visibility, and dark count prob-
ability were used to reconstruct the probability distribu-
tions of clicks in detector D1. These distributions, in
turn, were used to calculate the error probability from
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Transmitted information in our pro-
tocol. The blue area indicates the region where the classical
protocol transmits less information than our protocol, while
the red point shows our experimental results. The error bars
correspond to one standard deviation. For large n, our results
are strictly better than the best known classical protocol for
a range of practical values of the input size.
Eq. (5). Since our theoretical model is only an approxi-
mation, the error probability should also be understood
as approximate. The blue area indicates the informa-
tion transmitted by the best known classical protocol of
Ref. [32] which for this probability of error requires the
transmission of 16
√
n bits. The red points show our ex-
perimental results, where the data point for the largest n
is obtained from ID-500 and the other three data points
are obtained from Clavis2. Note that Clavis2 and ID-
500 have almost the same optics and functionality [34].
We use the same measurement and processing method
for the data obtained from these two systems, and show
the experimental results together in one figure instead of
two. The error bars come from the uncertainty in the
estimation of the mean photon number µ. For large n,
our experimental results are strictly better than those of
the classical protocol for a wide range of practical values
of the input size.
To obtain further insight into our results, we define the
quantum advantage γ as the ratio between the transmit-
ted classical information C of the best-known classical
protocol [32] and the upper bound Q on the transmitted
quantum information:
γ =
C
Q
. (7)
A value γ > 1 for a given error probability  implies that
less information is transmitted in the quantum case than
in the classical one. This allows us to use the quantum
advantage as a figure of merit to assess the performance
of our quantum fingerprinting implementation. In Fig. 6,
we show the experimental results for γ as a function of
different input sizes. For the three largest input sizes, the
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The quantum advantage γ between
the transmitted classical information and the upper bound
on the transmitted quantum information. For the three large
input sizes, the ratio is well above 1. The quantum advantage
was as large as γ = 1.66, which implies that the transmitted
information in the classical protocol was 66% larger than in
the quantum case.
ratio is well above 1, and the classical protocol transmit-
ted as much as 66% more information than the quantum
protocol. For the smallest input size, no quantum im-
provement was obtained.
Discussion
Based on the protocol of Ref. [28], we have experi-
mentally demonstrated a proof of concept quantum fin-
gerprinting system that is capable of transmitting less in-
formation than the best known classical protocol for this
problem. Our experimental test of this system indicates
that its operation is consistent with our model of the
devices and hence also with achieving the desired error
probability. Moreover, we have operated our system in a
parameter regime in which the information transmitted
in the protocol is up to 66% lower than the best known
classical protocol. This constitutes the first time that
a quantum fingerprinting protocol has been carried out
that is capable of achieving this reduction in the trans-
mitted information.
In communication complexity, it is assumed that the
parties have unlimited computational power. However,
from a practical perspective, it may not always be possi-
ble to ignore these computational requirements. In fact,
even though the running time during communication of
our experiment scales linearly with the input size, the
total running time of the protocol is dominated by the
time required to run the error-correcting code – which is
a crucial component of the protocol. For instance, at a
repetition rate of 5MHz, it takes 300 seconds to run the
communication for an output size of m = 1.5× 109. On
the other hand, even with the use of RLCs with quasi-
linear encoding complexity, 4831 seconds are needed to
run the encoding algorithm, as seen in Table I. There-
8fore, the practical advantages of quantum fingerprint-
ing, in terms of reductions in resource expenditures, will
likely be found in a reduction of the number of photons
used. This is a major property that our protocol pos-
sesses. Indeed, for the largest input size that we tested,
n = 1.42×108, a mean photon number of µ ≈ 7×103 was
used (see Supplementary material for details). Overall, it
is remarkable that quantum fingerprinting with coherent
states can be realized while revealing only a very small
amount of information to the referee – a feature of the
protocol that may have important applications to fields
such as cryptography [42] and information complexity
[43], where this extremely small leakage of information
plays a fundamental role.
In our quantum fingerprinting protocol, the maximum
reduction in the transmitted information depends cru-
cially on the dark count probability and the overall loss
in the system. Thus, our results can be directly improved
by using detectors with higher efficiency and lower dark
counts. This can lead to a quantum fingerprinting proto-
col that, with the use of available technology [44], trans-
mits several orders of magnitudes less information than
the best known classical protocol for large input sizes.
Even though there is no proof that the best known clas-
sical protocol is optimal, a lower bound for the classical
transmitted information was proven in Ref. [32]. This
lower bound states that, for any classical protocol with
error probability smaller than 0.01, Alice and Bob must
send at least
√
n
20 bits of information. This is roughly two
orders of magnitude smaller than the transmitted infor-
mation of the best known classical protocol. By using
state-of-the-art detectors, it should be possible to demon-
strate a quantum fingerprinting protocol capable of beat-
ing this classical lower bound. Achieving this would con-
stitute a significant milestone for experimental quantum
communication complexity.
The main challenges to achieving such a large reduc-
tion in the transmitted information are the computa-
tional requirements of the error-correcting algorithms as
well as using single-photon detectors with very small dark
count rates and high efficiency. Additionally, it is desir-
able to carry out the protocol in a configuration that,
unlike the plug&play scheme, permits Bob to be situ-
ated at a large distance from the referee. Finally, in
this work, we have tested our model of the system and
used that test to make an indirect assessment of the er-
ror probability based on our theoretical model. Future
implementations should improve on this by treating the
system as a black-box, using the data directly to make
statistical inferences about the error probability, without
relying on an approximate model of the system. Overall,
our results constitute a significant first step in the devel-
opment of experimental quantum communication com-
plexity, which may also be extended to other protocols
with a proven exponential advantage over the classical
case [11, 12, 29, 30].
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Supplementary Material
Error Probability Analysis
Let G be a random n × m Toeplitz matrix over F2.
There are two failure events associated with G: the min-
imum distance δ being not as large as promised (which
results in less-than-expected worst case performance)
and the matrix G being not full rank (which can cause
two different inputs to be mapped to the same output,
leading to a minimum distance of δ = 0). We will show
that, for any fixed rate R less than 1−H2(δ), the prob-
abilities of both failure events decreases exponentially
with the output size m and can thus be neglected for
sufficiently large m.
Theorem 1. [45] Let G ∈ Fn×m2 be a Toeplitz matrix
chosen uniformly at random. Let δmin(G) be the min-
imum distance of the linear code with G as generator
matrix. Then, for any δ ∈ (0, 1/2),
Pr(δmin(G) ≤ δ) ≤ 2−m(1−H2(δ)−R).
In particular, if R = 1−H2(δ)− , for some  > 0, then
Pr(δmin(G) ≤ δ) ≤ 2−m.
The above theorem guarantees that, if we sacrifice an
arbitrarily small quantity  of the rate with respect to the
Gilbert-Varshamov bound (i.e., we set R = 1−H2(δ)−),
the probability of obtaining an incorrect minimum dis-
tance decreases exponentially with the output size. For
example, for a value of m = 107 and  = 10−3, this prob-
ability is less than 10−10
4
.
9n 1.53× 106 1.20× 107 2.27× 107 1.42× 108
µA 1914±68 3295±118 3670±131 7120±254
D1,E 22 277 830 1939
D1,D 131 318 954 2224
D1,th 49 302 902 2110
Q 47689±1703 93152±3326 108129±3860 229713±8201
γ 0.83±0.02 1.19±0.05 1.41±0.05 1.66±0.06
 (1.6± 0.9)× 10−9 (2.3± 1.4)× 10−7 (6.6± 3.7)× 10−6 (2.9± 1.3)× 10−5
TABLE III: Detailed experimental results. The parameter µA is the mean photon number used by Alice. For the clicks in
detector D1 we report the observed averages for the case of equal inputs D1,E , different inputs D1,D and the threshold value used
by the referee D1,th. As before, Q is the upper bound on the quantum transmitted information, γ is the quantum advantage
and  the error probability of the protocol.
Theorem 2. Let G ∈ Fn×m2 be a Toeplitz matrix chosen
uniformly at random. Then,
Pr(G is not full rank) = 2−12−m(1−R).
Theorem 2 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1
in [46]. Once again, this probability decreases exponen-
tially with the output size m.
Detailed Experimental Results
In Table III, we report the complete results of our ex-
periment. The dominating source of uncertainty is the
uncertainty in the total mean photon number of the sig-
nals. This uncertainty is due to the summation of the
fluctuations of several devices, such as laser power, VOA,
and varying loss in the channel. For each input size
n, we perform a calibration process to determine µ. In
this process, with a proper value of VOA selected from
our numerical optimization, the referee sends out around
107 ∼ 108 pulses to Alice and Bob. From the total detec-
tion counts on D0 and D1 and the pre-calibrated losses
(Table II), we estimate the µ. We repeat this calibra-
tion process a few rounds and obtain the mean value and
the standard deviation for µ. These results are shown in
the second column of Table III. For all tested cases, the
uncertainty in mean photon number was below 4%.
From our model of the protocol, we use the uncer-
tainty in the mean photon number to directly calculate
an uncertainty for the quantum transmitted information
as well as for the error probability of the protocol. As
it can be seen from Table III, all error probabilities are
compatible with the system operating below the target
value of  = 5 × 10−5. Additionally, we have included
the average values observed for the number of clicks in
detector D1 for equal and different inputs, as well as the
threshold values used by the referee.
Finally, we estimate the effect of detector dead times
in our experiment as follows. For each input size, we
can calculate the probability p that an individual pulse
leads to a click in detector D1. In our setup, after a
click occurs, the following 50 pulses are blocked by the
detector and cannot be registered. The probability p′
that a click occurs for these 50 pulses is given by p′ =
1− (1− p)50 ≈ 50p. This number is very small whenever
p is small, as is the case in our experiment. For instance,
for an input size of n = 1.42×108, the expected number of
blocked clicks is approximately 0.1% of the total expected
clicks. Therefore, this effect is negligible compared to
fluctuations in the mean photon number, which is of the
order of 4%.
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